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Militants in Afghanistan’s predominately Turkmen populated Faryab Province have seized 
more than 100 villages in July alone, with pro-government paramilitary troops retreating 
across the region. The withdrawal, in Afghanistan, of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mission and the alleged sightings of IS militants in the country has combined to 
cause uncertainty in Ashgabat over the state’s capacity to protect its borders from non-
traditional (i.e. state-to-state) threats. 
More menacing is the growth of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, who view 
Turkmenistan as a gateway into the region. With a large, disgruntled Uzbek population, 
under-trained and under-resourced border forces, and significant oil supplies located near the 
Afghan border, Ashgabat is a tempting target. Turkmenistan, isolated and neutral, is 
increasingly the weak-link in the Central Asian security chain. 
Multi lateral  Security Organizations and the Doctrine of  Positive Neutrality 
Turkmenistan’s neutrality is primarily a strategy for balancing external actors and retaining a 
high degree of autonomy. However, the recent surge in violence in northern Afghanistan has 
left Turkmenistan vulnerable to an IMU offensive, alarming its neighbors. Rather than rely on 
Russia, Ashgabat is reaching out to the West, partly to test the waters and see how much the 
West is willing to invest. But also, to vie for time as the regime attempts to defend its own 
borders without Russian aid. 
TURKMENISTAN’S STRUGGLE TO CONTAIN NON-
TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS 
BY BRADLEY JAMES JARDINE 
Turkmenistan’s regime has attracted attention over the years by virtue of 
its foreign policy position, namely, the Doctrine of Positive Neutrality. 
In this article, Bradley James Jardine explains how this UN-recognized 
status as a neutral state is being tested by recent events just across the 
border in Afghanistan.!
“MORE MENACING IS THE GROWTH OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN,
WHO VIEW TURKMENISTAN AS A GATEWAY INTO THE REGION. ”  
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Turkmenistan’s foreign policy was codified on 12 December 1995, when the General Assembly 
of the United Nations approved an ad hoc resolution [A/50/80(A)] endorsing the regime’s 
request for the status of permanent neutrality. The addition of the active component, the 
adjective “positive,” is innovative, with regime officials arguing that neutrality does not entail 
“self-isolation [but] it does entail a constructive position.” Indeed, Turkmenistan has been 
politically active, assuming a status of regional peace-making center. During the Tajik Civil 
War, Ashgabat provided a platform for negotiations between rival parties. Additionally, in 
2007, the headquarters of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for 
Central Asia (UNRCCA) was established in Turkmenistan to assist the region’s stability.  
Due to Ashgabat’s worsening relations with Russia over gas disputes, and fears of 
overdependence on China, Turkmenistan has been actively seeking cooperation with the 
West in both energy trading and security. The European Union has revived the idea of a 
Trans-Caspian Pipeline, with plans to have it built by 
2019. This resumption of talks was even 
accompanied by subtle legislative changes in 
Turkmenistan; for example, on 12 March the 
organization of demonstrations was legalized and 
earlier another, third political party was created. 
Although these moves are cosmetic, they still provide 
insight into Ashgabat’s foreign policy.  
Turkmenistan has also signaled significant moves towards security cooperation with the 
West. 2015 marked the 20th anniversary of the UN’s recognition of Ashgabat’s status of 
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permanent neutrality, with the regime rebranding 2015 as “the year of neutrality and peace.” 
2015 also marked the 20th anniversary of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with 
Central Asia. Turkmenistan’s authorities decided to combine the events by hosting a 
conference from March 2-3, titled “issues of peace and stability in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan: a view from neutral Turkmenistan,” which was sponsored by NATO.  Ironic, 
considering the country is suffering unprecedented security problems on its border. Indeed, 
following this conference on 26 March, General Lloyd Austin, head of U.S. Central 
Command testified before Congress that Turkmenistan is interested in both military 
cooperation and the purchase of U.S. military equipment.  
These moves are controversial since Turkmenistan, unlike its neighbors, is neither a member 
of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), nor China’s 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Signaling Moscow’s 
irritation on March 18, the CSTO’s secretary, Nikolai Bordiuzha, 
strongly criticized Ashgabat for not cooperating in the fight against 
terrorism. The Kremlin is fearful of the IMU’s growing activities in 
the region, particularly after some of the organization’s Uzbek 
members were arrested in 2013 in Moscow for planning to carry out 
attacks, but also willing to take advantage of the instability to project 
its power into the region.  
Turkmenistan’s efforts to attract the west are unlikely to bear fruit; after all, American 
assistance in the field of security amounted to a measly $1.3 million in 2014. Ashgabat needs to 
seriously consider further cooperation with its neighbors as its borders are becoming 
increasingly unstable, and the regime’s defensive strategies have, so far, largely resulted in 
failure.  
Are the IMU a Threat to Turkmenistan? 
The IMU haven’t launched any successful offensive into Central Asia since the 2009 attacks in 
the Fergana Valley. However, since then, the IMU has been trying to establish a foothold in 
northern Afghanistan by embedding with the Taliban and radicalizing the region’s Uzbek, 
Tajik, and Turkmen communities. The group has been fighting in Afghanistan to form a base 
from which to project its power into Central Asia, with the explicit aim of destabilizing the 
secular, authoritarian regimes and establishing an Islamic order. Furthermore, after operating 
in northern Afghanistan for many years, the group has become a major stakeholder in 
Afghanistan’s multi-billion drug economy, with aims to open smuggling routes further. 
“THE IMU HAS BEEN FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN TO FORM A BASE FROM
WHICH TO PROJECT ITS POWER INTO CENTRAL ASIA” !
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The problems have intensified the past year with a huge influx of 
Uzbek families, allegedly from Pakistan. In June 2014, following 
the IMU bombing of the Karachi airport, the Pakistani military 
started large-scale operations in North Waziristan, where IMU 
militants had been hiding since the outbreak of the 2001 War on 
Terror, when allied forces forced them to flee into the tribal 
areas. Since then, the estimated number of IMU fighters 
currently operating is anywhere between 5,000 and 7,000. 
The Taliban and IMU have been long-term allies, and even today, the two continue to enjoy a 
symbiotic relationship. The Taliban’s ties to the IMU – whose rank and file are Sunni 
Muslims of Central Asian origin – raises its standing among ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks and 
Turkmen, thus furthering its support base. In return, the IMU enjoys Taliban supported 
sanctuaries in the north from which it can recruit allies, control smuggling routes, and launch 
attacks into Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. 
With the Afghan government’s recent revelation that Mullah Omar, the leader and founder of 
the Taliban, is dead, infighting could strengthen the hand of the IMU. Indeed, even prior to 
the official announcement, tensions have been mounting. Several senior Taliban commanders, 
having no evidence that Omar was alive, had already defected to the IMU. The loss of field 
commanders and rank-and-file fighters to splinter groups and rival militant groups could 
deprive the Taliban of troop numbers and effective leadership, further constraining their 
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capacity to restrain radical IMU militants. Furthermore, days after the announcement, the 
IMU released a video declaring allegiance to the Islamic State. This is likely a move to appeal 
to more radical elements within the Taliban, and to attract the small number of Central 
Asians who have been travelling to fight in Syria. 
Turkmenistan offers several enticements for an IMU offensive. Firstly, Turkmenistan’s 
neighbors are militarily stronger and receive significant levels of military aid from both Russia 
and the West. For example, Russia donated military equipment and weapons worth $1.5 
billion to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and Russian troops actively guard the Tajik border. 
Meanwhile, the sanctions on Uzbekistan for its atrocious human rights record were removed 
in January allowing the U.S. to make its largest military donation 
to Central Asia of 300 armored vehicles amounting to $300 million. 
Turkmenistan, by contrast, receives very minimal military aid and 
isn’t a part of any defensive organizations. This makes its huge, 
744-kilometer border across open desert extremely vulnerable.  
Secondly, Uzbeks are concentrated near the Afghan and Uzbek border in the Lebap and 
Dashoguz provinces of Turkmenistan. They now constitute the largest minority group in the 
country, at nearly 6 percent of the population, and they’re extremely disgruntled with the 
central government. The policies of “Turkmenization” have had particularly adverse effects on 
Uzbeks. In addition to having effectively banned the use of Uzbek as a medium of instruction 
in schools, the drive for “full-blooded” Turkmen as government employees had, by the end of 
the 2004, resulted in virtually all Uzbeks being removed or not employed in high and mid-level 
administrative positions in the areas where they are concentrated. This discrimination could 
easily boil over with some sustained provocation from Uzbek IMU radicals. 
Finally, there is the issue of norm transmission from the Islamic State to the IMU. ISIS 
consolidated its grip over oil supplies in Iraq and now preside over a sophisticated smuggling 
empire. These profits helped ISIS pay is burgeoning wages bill with $500 a month for regular 
fighters, and about $1,200 for commanders. Crucially, Turkmenistan has significant oil 
supplies just over the border in the Uzbek populated Lebap province in the Seidi refinery, and 
would provide the IMU a powerful competitive advantage in their recruitment campaign. 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Non-State Security Providers 
Turkmenistan has been actively seeking allies in 
Afghanistan to act as a buffer between the state and 
Taliban occupied areas. Not surprisingly, these potential 
allies have predominately been drawn from among their 
ethnic cousins along the border. However, the Afghan 
Turkmen have reason to view Ashgabat as an enemy, 
rather than a friend. 
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Currently, an estimated 1.5 million Turkmens live in Afghanistan – making up 3 percent of the 
country’s overall population. They are located primarily in the country’s northern provinces of 
Jowzjan, and Faryab. Seeking a pro-active policy, Turkmen officials reached out to ethnic-
Turkmen leaders to stabilize the border against Taliban and IMU attacks. On February 18, 
2015, Azatlyk reported that Turkmenistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Vepa Hajiyev, met with 
ethnic Turkmen elders in Afghanistan in secret, to dissuade them from supporting the 
Taliban. However, the Turkmen authorities have been alienating, to put it mildly.  
In February, Afghan Turkmens in northern Faryab, in the Marchak district were in a 
desperate situation, appealing to Turkmenistan’s elites. The area was surrounded on three 
sides by the Taliban, which had cut the region off from the central government in Kabul. 
Village leaders had requested that Turkmenistan grant citizen’s safe passage in order to 
circumvent the Taliban and receive aid in Turgundy, in the Herat Province. Their requests 
were ignored. 
Furthermore, Turkmenistan's efforts to seal its borders have provoked ethnic Turkmen on the 
Afghan side.The village of Karkin came under fire from Afghan police on March 16, 2015, after 
residents protested against the Turkmenistani border guards’ decision to expel villagers from 
a small island on the Amu Darya River, which had been 
essential for grazing cattle. The border guards had built 
barrier lines and wire entanglements on the island, 
considering it to be part of the border-zone. Many reports 
from Afghan Turkmen mention imprisonment and torture by 
Turkmenistan’s border guards, and some even revealed they’d 
had their ears cut off. 
These moves have genuine implications for President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s 
regime. According to the exiled chairman of the banned Republican Party of Turkmenistan, 
many dissidents from Turkmenistan have been leaving to collaborate with ethnic Turkmen in 
the IMU to recruit in the bordering regions and destabilize Ashgabat. 
Turkmenistan has also been hoping to build a relationship with the Taliban to keep the 
radical IMU in check, largely by relying on the same methods it used in the 1990s, when it 
supplied oil to Taliban government in exchange for détente. Indeed, during Afghanistan’s rule 
by the Taliban, Turkmenistan – unlike the other Central Asian republics – enjoyed a close, 
unofficial relationship with the government in Kabul. Ashgabat infamously instructed its 
state-media service not to portray the Taliban regime in a negative light. Turkmenistan even 
cooperated with the Taliban on security issues. For example, when ethnic Turkmen from 
Afghanistan fled into Turkmenistan’s territory during their insurgency against the Taliban, 
Ashgabat’s authorities returned them to Afghanistan, where a significant number were 
subsequently executed. Today, Turkmenistan lacks a positive relationship with the Taliban. 
On March 18, 2014, Berdymukhammedov met with Salahuddin Rabbani, the chairman of the 
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High Peace Council of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – a body appointed by the former 
Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, to negotiate with elements of the Taliban. At the meeting, 
Turkmenistan agreed to supply electricity to Afghanistan’s Faryab Province on favorable 
terms, as well as deliver humanitarian aid to facilitate the region’s recovery. Ashgabat also 
offered itself as a platform for negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban.  
Since then, relations between Ashgabat and the Taliban insurgents have gone from bad, to 
worse. On February 26, 2015, militants crossed into Turkmenistan from Afghanistan’s 
Baghdis province killing three border guards. The firefight was allegedly in retaliation to 
Turkmenistan’s border guards killing a Taliban insurgent and arresting two others. 
Furthermore, on July 26, 2015, Taliban militants cut Turkmenistan’s electricity supply cables 
to Faryab, plunging the region into darkness.  
With these proactive attempts at diplomatic, “positive” outreach failing, Ashgabat has fallen 
back into a habit of isolation, fortifying its borders in a last ditch attempt to defend its territory. 
In the long run, such attempts are foolish at best. 
Turkmenistan’s  Manpower Shortages 
Turkmenistan’s border forces lack rigorous training and the state’s non-commitment to 
external security alliances has caused the state to re-organize and squeeze as many resources as 
possible to sustain its insufficient border security force. A key initiative has involved the mass 
mobilization of military reserves along the Afghan border.  
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At present, 60,000 young Turkmenistanis enter prime draft-age each year, but Ashgabat has 
been struggling to fulfill its quotas. Firstly, some 800,000 young men work as migrant 
laborers, with more seeking to join their numbers amidst the economic uncertainty caused by 
the January 2015 currency devaluation. In addition, many Turkmen boys receive military 
deferments if they go into higher educational institutions. According to a leaked government 
census from 2012, over 42,000 Turkmen students study abroad each year.  
In response to the exodus of labor, migration and border services have closed the borders to 
prevent males of recruitment age from leaving the country to seek work abroad. Students are 
also facing difficulties. On July 15, RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, known locally as Azatlyk, 
reported that boys above the age of 18 who have not yet served in the military will no longer be 
entitled to study outside the country. Furthermore, the Chronicles of Turkmenistan reported 
that in response to shortages, military units near the border were not demobilized during the 
recruitment cycle in November, meaning they haven’t been serving far longer than their two-
year requirement.  
The government’s crackdown on draft evasion has also caused the 
black market to flourish. The cost of a bribe for documentation 
proving a recruit to be “medically unfit” for service has risen to $600. 
Another bribe, certifying that the bearer has already performed 
military service, when he has not, can command as much as $4,000.  
Drug-use and drug trafficking provide an additional threat to units along the Afghan border, 
and many of the problems arose as a result of Niyazov’s “known unknown” tolerance of 
trafficking. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that the use of opiates 
experienced a 17-fold increase in Turkmenistan from 1991-2002. The agency added by stating 
that 1 percent of the country’s population could be considered regular users of injected drugs. 
Such patterns have been associated with the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in the country. 
Although Berdymukhammedov has genuinely curbed drug-use, problems still remain near the 
border, and the IMU’s resources and connections could easily undermine security. 
Finally, the Turkmen military suffers from a critically low state of morale. As of January 2015, 
due to both horrendous living conditions, and abusive officers, eight recruits committed 
suicide and another 45 suffered serious health problems, becoming permanently disabled. 
Desertion is also a prominent problem with over 100 officers leaving their rank since January 
in response to being assigned to dangers districts on the Afghan border.  
Ashgabat is dangerously positioned and the regime is running out of options. Turkmenistan 
needs to co-operate with its neighbors if it’s to effectively defend itself.  
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